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CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

of a citizen's rights under the Federal Constitution. 15 It would appear
that the Congressmen not only wished to grant redress for the ordinary
torts of the day committed by state officials, but also from the unrefuted
statements of antagonists to the bill, one would be led to believe it was
their intent to sanction such actions as libel, defamation, and invasion of

privacy.
R. E.

BECKER

TAXATION-INcomE TAX-WHETHER THE PHRASE "USEFUL LIFE" REFERS TO ACTUAL USEFUL LIFE OR TIM PERIOD OF USEFULNESS TO A PARTICULAR TAXPAYER AND WHETHER THERE IS AN AMOUNT OTHER THAN
THE BUILT-IN SALVAGE VALUE BELOW WHICH A TAXPAYER USING THE
DECLINING BALANCE METHOD MAY NOT DEPRECIATE THE ASSET-In Hertz

Corporationv. United States,' the genius of the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue has once again run the gamut of Appellate and Supreme Court
review in attempting to prevent the drawing of a credit claimed against
the United States Treasury. The Hertz Corporation, engaged in leasing
and renting trucks and automobiles on both a long and short term basis,
was merged into by the J. Frank Connor, Inc., through a statutory
merger in 1956, thereby becoming entitled to file claims for refund of
Federal Income Tax to which Connor Inc. might have been entitled. The
merged corporation had used the straight line method of depreciation ;2
however, the 1954 revision to the Internal Revenue Code provided the
15 "Suits may be instituted without regard to amount or character of claim by
any person within the limits of the United States who conceives that he has been
deprived of any right, privilege, or immunity secured him by the Constitution of
the United States, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage of any state. That is to say, that if a police officer of the city of Richmond
or New York should find a drunken negro or white man upon the streets with
loaded pistol flourishing it, and by virtue of any ordinance, law, or usage, either of
city or state, he takes it away, the officer may be sued, because the right to bear
arms is secured by the Constitution." Whitthorne of Tennessee, Cong. Globe, 42d
Cong., 1st Sess., 337 (1871).
"It authorizes any person who is deprived of any right, privilege or immunity
secured to him by the Constitution of the United States, to bring an action against
the wrongdoer in the Federal Courts, and that without any limit whatsoever as
to the amount in controversy. The deprivation may be of the slightest conceivable
character, the damages in the estimation of any sensible man may not be five
dollars or even five cents, they may be what lawyers call merely nominal damages."
Thurman of Ohio, Id. at 216.
1364 U. S. 122, 80 S. Ct. 1420, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1569 (1960).
226 U. S. C. § 167 (1958); Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 167; as well as Int. Rev.
Code of 1939, § 23, provide the authority for the use of the straight line method
of depreciation of property used in the trade or business, or of property held for
the production of income. Under this method the taxpayer deducts the cost of
the property in equal annual installments during the life of the property. The
amount deducted each year is the result of multiplying the reciprocal of the remaining useful life by the depreciated basis (in the first year, the purchase price
less salvage value).
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authority for the use of an accelerated, declining balance method of
depreciation 3 on depreciable property meeting certain requirements. Due
to its volume of business, the Company was able to purchase its automobiles and trucks at a volume discount and by depreciating them, using
a useful life basis of four years for automobiles and five years for4
trucks, with the declining balance method, a tax refund was computed
and applied for. The Commissioner, with a tight grip on his purse, failed
to recognize the claim and prepared for the siege by Massey, Evans, and
Hertz.5 Hertz chalked up a quick first round victory in the District
Court

;6

7
but, to the astonishment of most, but not all observers, the

Court of Appeals reversed.8 Certiorari was granted and the Supreme
Court of the United States dealt a staggering dollar and cents blow to
the business world, which stunned the accounting world, by affirming the
holding of the Appellate Court that the phrase "useful life" of an asset
has reference to the useful life to the particular taxpayer and that under
the declining balance method the asset cannot be depreciated below its
resale value.
326 U. S. C. § 167(b) (2)

(1958), Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 167(b)

(2), provides

two methods of depreciation foreign to the 1939 Code. Under one of these, the
declining balance method, a fixed percentage (not more than twice the straight
line depreciation rate) of the unrecovered cost of an asset is deducted each year

as depreciation.
For the
4 Hertz actually computed a three year refund totaling $14,561.12.
purposes of illustration, however, a simplified example of how this resulted will
better serve the purpose. Assume that a corporation is in a position to purchase
automobiles for $2,000. The automobile is depreciated under the straight line
method, using a basis of four years useful life, at a rate of $500 per year. Assume
further, that due to certain variable factors, which will be discussed below, the
corporation decides to sell the automobile twelve months after purchase for $1,500.
The amount of depreciation taken during the twelve month period amounts to
$500. On the other hand, if the declining balance method is applied, using the
same useful life basis, a different result is reached. The total dbpreciation over
the twelve month period will amount to $1,000. A sale for $1,500 thus results in
a long term capital gain, under Sec. 1231 of the 1954 Code, of $500. Now, by
applying these two examples to a hypothetical taxable income before depreciation
of $10,000, the basis for the refund is seen. In the first instance a deduction of
$500 was taken against an income of $10,000 leaving a balance of $9,500 taxable
as ordinary income for that twelve month period. In the second instance, a deduction of $1,000 was made from the same figure leaving only $9,000 taxable as
ordinary income and $500 taxable as a long term capital gain.
5 Massey Motors, Inc. v. United States, 364 U. S. 92 (1960), and Commissioner
of Internal Revenue v. Robley H. Evans and Julia M. Evans, 361 U. S. 92 (1960),
were companion cases to the Hertz case. The Evans case involved much the
same facts as Hertz but Massey dealt with the depreciation, by an automobile
retailer, of executive cars as well as automobiles which Massey rented to an unaffiliated finance company. Although the issues are related, the Evans and Massey
cases were decided under the 1939 Code while the 1954 Code applies to the Hertz
case. The great significance of the holdings in this case will be seen more clearly
in the discussion of the second phase of the Hertz case. Those holdings were that
salvage value for the purposes of depreciation, is not junk value but resale value.
6 165 F. Supp. 261 (D. Del., 1958).
7 Kirby, 54 Nw. U. L. Rev. 434, argues that the opinion of the Court of Appeals is
supported by both law and reason and he concludes that affirmance by the Supreme
Court will probably follow.
8 268 F. 2d 604 (3rd Cir., 1959).
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Section 167 of the 1954 Code restricts the use of the declining balance
method of depreciation to those instances where the asset has a "useful
life" of three years or more 9 The Commissioner realized that if he could
successfully show that the automobiles which Hertz (the Connor Company) had held for an average of 26.17 months each,' 0 during the years
in question, would not qualify for accelerated depreciation because they
did not meet the "useful life" requirement, Hertz would be unsuccessful
in its claim. Unquestionably, the automobiles had an economic useful life
of four years; but, argued the Commissioner, "useful life" always has
meant the useful life to the particular taxpayer, i.e., the taxpayer's holding
period."
A depreciation deduction is defined as a reasonable allowance for
exhaustion, wear, and tear. 12 By way of a hypothetical,' 3 the taxpayer
points out that under the government's treatment of "useful life"
the definition of depreciation is changed to something indeterminate"(S) ome combination of exhaustion, wear and tear and other considerations foreign to and unconnected with the wearing out of the assets and
the direction of the statute. "14 Although its exactness depends upon the
outcome of the second phase of the case, 15 the Commissioner has an
answer-'"It is not wear and tear in the abstract which is to be recovered
through depreciation deductions; it is the wear and tear measured by
the difference between the cost of the asset and its estimated salvage value
when it is resold. "16
9 26 U. S. C. § 167(c) (1958) ; Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 167(c).
Holding Period in Months
10
Year ended
Shortest
Longest
Average
No. of Vehicles
March 31
67
21
32
28
1954
23
30
39
12
1955
16
51
66
23
1956
11 Both the Commissioner and Hertz agreed that the 1954 Internal Revenue
Code did not change, and was not an attempt to change the prior law as to what
the useful life of an asset is. However, the Commissioner contended that pre 1954
Income Tax Law was that "useful life" meant useful life to the taxpayer while
Hertz contended the same was the economic usefulness of the asset.
1226 U. S. C. § 167(a) (1958); Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 167(a).
13 Brief for the Petitioner, p. 20, Note 1, Ante. "For example, let us consider
the case of two taxpayers who are In the same type of business and who buy-at
the same time and at the same price-an identical asset. (Let us assume also the
same degree of physical usage and wear and tear, and the same inspection and
repair procedures.) Similarly, suppose that the two taxpayers accurately estimate their holding periods differently-all else being the same.
"Under the Government's definition of useful life, depreciation will be computed differently for the two taxpayers in the above example, despite the fact
that the assets involved will be undergoing exactly the same rate of exhaustion,
wear and tear contemplated by the statute."
14 Ibid.
15 Treasury Regulations, Note 45, Infra.
16 Brief for Respondent, p. 24, Note 1, Ante.
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The case for Hertz advances on the proposition that a host of earlier
decisions 17 (pre 1954) support its position. The Commissioner, while
playing with words and ideas in order to convince the Court that these
cases had no application here, overlooked the fact that Petitioner was
more concerned with showing that the Commissioner himself was inconsistent in his arguments' s than in citing the cases as authority for his
position. To further substantiate this proposition, Petitioner requested
consideration of several, more recent cases, 19 including the words of the
Court 0 and the argument of the Commissioner 2 1 in the Philber case and
the argument of the Commissioner in the Penn case 22 as well as others in
17 See Sanford Cotton Mills, 14 B. T. A. 1210 (1929), where the Commissioner
reduced the rate of depreciation of taxpayer's trucks to 20% (five-year life) from
33 % (three-year life). The evidence showed that the taxpayer actually kept
and used the trucks for approximately 2% years. Inconsistent with the Commissioner's position in the Hertz case, the Board of Tax Appeals found favor with
the Commissioner by holding that a 25% rate (four-year life) was reasonable.
In Appeal of Merkle Broom Co., 3 B. T. A. 1084 (1926), where, although the evidence showed that taxpayer purchased a new fleet of "Salesmen's cars" every two
years, the Commissioner again argued that the rate should be decreased from
33 % (three-year life) to 20% (five-year life). Again the Board of Tax Appeals announced that a 25% rate (four-year life) was reasonable. See also,
Appeal of West Virginia & Pennsylvania Coal & Coke Co., 1 B. T. A. 790 (1925) ;
Appeal of J. R. James, 2 B. T. A. 1071 (1925); Max Kurtz v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, 8 B.T.A. 679 (1927) ; Whitman-Douglas Co. v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, 8 B. T. A. 694 (1927) ; Wallace G. Kay v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 10 B. T. A. 534 (1928) ; John A. Maguire Estate Ltd. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 17 B. T. A. 394 (1929) ; Cohen v. Lowe, 234 F. 474
(1916).
18 The problem presented by this case is quite unique. Heretofore, the Commissioner, in order to faithfully perform his duties, has endeavored to force the
longest possible "useful life" period upon the taxpayer inasmuch as this would
result in a lesser deduction for depreciation each year and therefore result in the
greatest tax advantage for the government. Here, on the other hand, the Commissioner has found it necessary to plead for a shorter "useful life" period to be
enforced in order to place the government in the best position, taxwise.
19 Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 15 TCM 1027 (1956); Charlie Hillard, 31 T. C.
961 (1959); Davidson v. Tomlinson, 165 F. Supp. 455 (1958); Lynch-Davidson
Motors, Inc. v. Tomlinson, 172 F. Supp. 101 (1958).
20 Philber Equipment Corporation v. Commissioner, 237 F. 2d 129 at 130 (1956).
"Taxpayer knew that when equipment was purchased, it would probably be able
to rent the equipment for a period substantially less than its useful life, and sale
of the equipment would follow expiration of the lease."
21 Brief for Respondent, p. 5, Philber Equipment Corporation v. Commissioner,
237 F. 2d 129 (1956). "Because of existing conditions taxpayer knew when it purchased equipment that it would be likely be able to rent such equipment only for a
period that was substantially less than its useful life."
22 Brief for Respondent, p. 10, Penn v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 199
F. 2d 210 (1952). "The basic fallacy in taxpayer's argument lies in her assumption that 'depreciation' has reference to the life of the owner of property, rather
than to the life of the property itself. . . . Taxpayer's argument disregards not
only the portion of Section 23(1) which deals specifically with property held by
a life tenant, but the general provision that depreciation deductions are allowable 'for the exhaustion, wear and tear . . . of property'. The 'wear and tear
of property' has no relation to the life expectancy of its owner. On taxpayer's
theory, every owner of a depreciable interest in property would be entitled to
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the same vein,2 3 and concluded, "Just as the wear and tear of property has
no relation to the life expectancy of its owner, the wear and tear of
property has no relation to the holding period of its owner. "24
Petitioner also relies on Bulletin "F"2-5 in support of his contention.
Perhaps the Petitioner should have been more cautious in his discussion
of the Bulletin but this does not change the fact that it is a starting point
from which correct rates may be determined. He was deft, but not
convincing, in arguing that if the Commissioner's definition of useful life
was adopted there would be no need for the Bulletin. 26 The Court appropriately points out the distinguishing feature that one asset may be
acquired with an intention of utilizing it for its full economic life (here
the Bulletin would provide a starting point) while the same 27asset may
be purchased by another to be used for a much shorter period.
Some of the most convincing evidence in taxpayer's behalf was the
introduction of expert testimony 28 to the effect that "useful life" meant
the business life of the asset regardless of whether or not it changed
hands 9 and further that it has been the practice to use a four year useful
life in the case of automobiles. 30 What is more, the witness from the
Arthur Andersen firm, in answer to a hypothetical based on the facts of
this case, testified that he would advise a client to depreciate by using
a useful life of four years even though it would be sold prior to the
deduct annual depreciation at a rate based on the number of years he expects to
live and enjoy the income from the property, instead of the number of years the
property may be expected to produce income, a result repugnant to the fundamental concepts of depreciation."
23 Herbert Shainberg, et al., 33 T. C. 241 (1959) ; Terminal Realty Corporation, 32 B. T. A. 623 (1935).
24 Reply Brief for Petitioner, p. 12, Note 1, Ante.
25A guide to taxpayers issued by the Internal Revenue Service, dealing with
depreciation and setting out average rates by which to measure the useful life of
various types of property. Revised in January 1942 and again in 1955 (I. R. S.
Publication Number 173).
26 Brief for Petitioner, p. 34, Note 1, Ante. "We do not believe it plausible
that when the Commissioner listed in Bulletin 'F' (page 52): 'Trucks: . . .
medium--6 years; Heavy-8 years', he meant that a medium truck would be kept
and used by a given taxpayer for six years, but a heavy truck would be used by
that taxpayer for eight years. Did he not unquestionably mean that though it
would be almost impossible to foretell when a taxpayer might decide perhaps for
reasons wholly unconnected with the condition of the truck, to sell it to a neighbor
or trade it in on a new one, it was feasible to say that a medium truck, whether
in one taxpayer's or a half dozen taxpayers' hands, has a life of approximately
six years, whereas a heavy truck has a life of approximately eight years."
27 Note 1, Ante.
28 Partners in the leading accounting firms of Ernst & Ernst, Price Waterhouse & Co., and Arthur Andersen & Co.
29 Record, pp. 29, 33, Note 1, Ante.
30 Ibid.
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expiration of that period. 31 On this basis the District Court found, "Over
the years, 'useful life' has come to be regarded in the field of business
and accounting to mean the business life of an asset regardless of whether
it passed from one owner to another. "3 The Commissioner follows the
34
lead of Kirby 3 and retorts with a text book definition of useful life
5
which favors his contention. The Court of Appeals in passing follows
the text book and fails to attach any significance to the fact that the book
was published after the fact of the depreciated assets here in issue.
The Court of Appeals apparently based its decision 36 on a statement
made by Mr. Justice Brandeis in the Ludey case, 37 which appears to be
dictum to the extent relied upon here. The crucial words, "useful life
of the plant in the business," said the Commissioner, refer to the taxpayer's business and this ".

.

view has consistently been taken by other

courts and by the Commissioner . . ."38 but, save for a few insignificant
pronouncements by the Commissioner and the very Treasury Regulations8 9
taxpayer is challenging in this case, he conveniently forgets to tell us by
which courts his ". . view has consistently been taken. . . ." The Court
of Appeals attached the significance asked for by the government to this
phrase but denied consideration of the fact that substantially the same
phrase40 used in the Treasury Regulations from 1918 until 1942 was
substituted with "useful life of the depreciable property" 4 1 in the 1942
and subsequent Regulations. The taxpayer's reasoning leads to the conclusion that the phrase "property in the business" merely establishes a
qualification on the kind of property that may be depreciated. The
42
Supreme Court, however, considered this to be a "strained meaning"
and upheld the lower court.
31

Record, pp. 60, 64, Note 1, Ante.

32 165 F. Supp. 261 at 265 (1958).
33 Note 7, Ante.

Finney & Miller, "Principles of Accounting," 5th ed., 1958, pp. 352-396.
35 268 F. 2d 604 (1959).
34

36 Record, p. 138, Note 1, Ante.
37 United States v. Ludey, 274 U. S. 295 at 300, 47 S. Ct. 608, 71 L. Ed. 1054
(1927).
"The amount of the allowance for depreciation is the sum which should
be set aside for the taxable year, in order that, at the end of the useful life of
the plant in the business, the aggregate of the sums set aside will (with the
salvage value) suffice to provide an amount equal to the original cost."
38 Brief for Respondent, p. 20, Note 1, Ante.
39 Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-1(b)
(1959). "Useful life.-For the purpose of Section 167 the estimated useful life of an asset is not necessarily the useful life
inherent in the asset but is the period over which the asset may reasonably be
expected to be useful to the taxpayer in his trade or business or in the production of his income. ...
11
40 "useful life of property In the business."
41 Treas. Reg. § 29.23(1)-1 (1942).
42 Massey Motors, Inc. v. United States, 364 U. S. 92 (1960).
The Court in
the Hertz decision dismissed the issue of useful life with a few words and a
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The fact that the Treasury Department itself refuses to take a definite
stand in Bulletin "F" would seem to reflect that the subjective intent
of the taxpayer is nebulous at the outset and to point out that economic
usefulness is a much more practical and sensible test. The decision of the
Court favoring the conception of useful life called for by the Conmissioner leaves the already murky area of depreciation with an even greater
headache for the taxpayer by placing the additional variable element of
subjective intent on the all too long list of variable factors43 which determine the period for which a taxpayer will be allowed to depreciate a
depreciable asset.
The second phase of the Hertz case involved a refund claim resulting
from a recomputation of the depreciation on rental trucks which the
company had sold in the years in question.44 The trucks, unlike the automobiles involved in the first part of the case, had been held by the company, on the average, for more than three years.4 5 This qualified them
for the declining balance method of depreciation under any definition of
useful life. The Commissioner is backed up by the Treasury Regulations4 6
in his claim that even under the declining balance method, an asset cannot
be depreciated below a reasonable salvage value; he then justifiably relies
referral to the decision in the Massey case (a companion case involving substantially the same issue, decided however, under the 1939 code rather than the 1954
code). Since both parties and the Court agreed that the meaning of useful life
did not change with the adoption of the 1954 Code, it was unnecessary to reconsider the issue in the light of the 1954 Code.
43Treas. Reg. §1.167(a)-1(b)
(1959). "This period," useful life, "shall be
determined by reference to his experience with similar property taking into account present conditions and probable future developments. Some of the factors
to be considered in determining this period are (1) wear and tear and decay or
decline from natural causes, (2) the normal progress of the art, economic changes,
inventions, and current developments within the industry and the taxpayer's trade
or business, (3) the climatic and other local conditions peculiar to the taxpayer's
trade or business, and (4) the taxpayer's policy as to repairs, renewals, and replacements."
44As in the case of the automobiles, the Connor corporation had filed their
return for the years of 1954, 1955, and 1956, computing depreciation on their
trucks under the straight line method. A recomputation under the declining balance method combined with the application of Sec. 1231, Internal Revenue Code,
1954, provided the basis for the refund claim.
45
Year ended
Holding Period in Months
March 31
No. of Vehicles
Average
Longest
Shortest
1954
5
23
24
21
1955
4
45
51
32
1956
9
45
85
10
46 Treas. Reg. § l.167(b)-1(a) (1959).
"Application of Method-Under the
straight line method the cost or other basis of the property less its estimated
salvage value is deductible in equal annual amounts over the period of the estimated useful life of the property." Treas. Reg. § 1.167(b)-2(a) (1959).
"While
salvage is not taken into account in determining the annual allowances under this
method, in no event shall an asset (or an account) be depreciated below a reasonable salvage value."
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upon the Evans and Massey cases 47 for the proposition that salvage value
is not junk value but resale value. The claim of the Petitioner is dependent upon the theory that there is no authority for these regulations
pertaining to the declining balance method; but, because of the high
regard given to Treasury Regulations,48 he has two strikes against him
at the outset.
The Commissioner claims the authority exists in the language of
Section 167 (a) of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code allowing a "reasonable
allowance" for depreciation supported by Section 167(b) which provides
that this "reasonable allowance" shall be "computed in accordance with
regulations prescribed by the Secretary or his delegate." That the regulation is not only unauthorized but appears to be specifically prohibited,
strongly supports the Hertz position. The Committee Report clearly
expressed a Congressional intent to recognize that the declining balance
method of depreciation has an inherent salvage value. 49 The Commissioner however, was convinced that there was no inconsistency here
inasmuch as the regulation does not provide for a deduction but only a
cut off point, measured by salvage value, beyond which no further depreciation may be taken. Under the straight line depreciation, continued the
Commissioner, a taxpayer will recover a lesser amount because salvage
value may exceed the unrecovered cost under the declining balance method
and such a result would be in conflict with the intent expressed by the
Congress." ° However, there is another argument designed to cast doubt
upon the validity of the Regulation. The Senate recognized that fast total
write-offs would occur in the case of short lived assets and stated this
as the reason for the three year useful life requirement. 5 1 In no event
47
48

Note 5, Ante.

Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. South Texas Lumber Co., 333 U. S.
496 at 501 (1948). "This Court has many times declared that Treasury Regulations must be sustained unless unreasonable and plainly inconsistent with the
revenue statutes and that they constitute contemporaneous constructions by those
charged with administration of these statutes which should not be overruled except
for weighty reasons."
49 S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. at p. 201 (1954). "The salvage value
is not deducted from the basis prior to applying the rate, since under this method
(the declining balance method) at the expiration of useful life there remains an
undepreciated balance which represents salvage value."
50 H. R. Rep. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. at p. 25 (1954).
"The changes
made by your committee's bill merely affect the timing and not the ultimate
amount of depreciation deductions with respect to a property."
51 Ibid at p. 29. "Restriction of declining-balance rate on short lived assets.The use of the 200 percent declining balance rate in the case of short lived properties would result in extremely fast write-offs. For example, in the case of an
asset with a 2-year service life, the doubling of the 50-percent straight-line rate
would be equivalent to expensing the cost in the year of acquisition. These properties would retain substantial value and could be resold subject to capital gain
rates.
"To prevent unrealistic deductions and resulting tax avoidance, your committee has provided that the liberalized methods be made available only with
respect to assets with useful lives of 3 or more years."
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could a total write-off occur if the Committee had intended a limit below
which depreciation could not be taken. What is more, in recognizing
the problem, Congress provided a remedy; had they intended to remedy
the situation in the manner called for by the Commissioner and the
Treasury, they would have so done.
This contention in behalf of the taxpayer appears to be sound and
it is not without outside support.52 The Court however, sided with the
government and agreed that Sections 167(a) and 167(b) of the 1954
Internal Revenue Code provided the authority for the Regulations in
question.5 3 The Court distinguished between residue salvage or that which
"represents salvage value'' and ''true salvage value" and states
when true salvage value exceeds this amount, the latter (true salvage
value) controls." 54 Greater reliance was placed on the Commissioner's
argument that it was the intent of Congress to affect only the timing and
"not ultimate amount of depreciation deductions with respect to a prop".

erty. "15

Throughout the taxpayer's argument, the idea is advanced that this
case is an attempt by the Commissioner to maximize revenue by dealing
a death blow to capital gains treatment of depreciable property. 56 As the
Commissioner's position was upheld, the taxpayer will never realize
capital gain on the sale of depreciable property unless he mistakenly
estimates the resale price (salvage value according to the Commissioner
52 Graves, "Depreciation Problems," the Journal of Accountancy 43, 46 (Oct.
1956). "One of the features of the declining-balance method is that salvage does
not enter into the computation of depreciation allowances when that method is
used. Since the Code states specifically that depreciation allowances computed
under that method are to be treated as reasonable allowances, it would appear

that an asset could be depreciated below salvage value. That this may have been
the intent of Congress is indicated by the recognition of the Congressional committees that the mechanics of the method result in an ultimate salvage value
because the depreciation allowances are not sufficient to provide for complete
recovery of basis at the end of the estimated life of an asset. However, the regulations provide that an asset cannot be depreciated below salvage value under
any method. This provision is not unreasonable in Itself but there seems to be
no authority for it in the Code."
53 Note 1, ante. "There is nothing inherent in the declining balance system
which requires us to assume that depreciation should be allowed beyond what
reasonably appears to be the price that will be received when the asset is
retired."
54 Note 1, ante.
55 Note 50, ante.
5626 U. S. C. § 1231 (1958) ; Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1231. Under this section property used In the trade or business is first defined as including depreciable
property used in the trade or business and held for more than six months. The
section goes on to state that all recognized gains and losses during the taxable
year from sales or exchanges of property which is used in the trade or business,
are totaled. If the gains are in excess of the losses, they are treated as long
term capital gains. If the losses are in excess of the gains, they are treated as
ordinary gains and losses.
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and the Courts). But the Cohn case5 7 holds that depreciation deductions
should be disallowed to the extent that the taxpayer underestimates the
proceeds to be realized upon resale. In the application, therefore, capital
gains on depreciable property 58 are totally eliminated, a result that is
impossible to reconcile with the adoption of Section 1231. What is more,
this same result is quite repugnant to the purpose behind the liberalized
depreciation method5 9 for it tends to block the incentive for a rapid turnover of depreciable property. So, it would appear that at long last, the
Treasury Department has achieved through the courts the curtailment
of capital gains treatment which it has been attempting to attain since
1947 through legislation.60
"Many inequities are inherent in the income tax. We multiply them
needlessly by nice distinctions which have no place in the practical administration of the tax law. "'1
J. P. GRAvS

WILLs-RIGHTS OF DEVISEES AND LEGATEES--WHETHER INCOME
ING UNDER A TESTAMENTARY TRUST RELEASED FROM UNLAWFUL

LATION PASSES BY INTESTATE SUCCESSION-An

ARIS-

AdcuMu-

interesting question

con-

cerning the disposition to be made of income which had accumulated in a
testamentary trust for a longer period than permitted by law, was
recently presented to the Supreme Court of Illinois in the case of Murphy
v. Northern Trust Company.' In that case, the testator had left his
residuary estate in trust under a will dated in 1932 which directed the
trustee to pay his widow a specified sum monthly from the net income
thereof and to accumulate any sums in excess and to add them to the
57

Cohn v. United States, 259 F. 2d 371 (6th Cir., 1958).

58 Note 56, ante.
59 Note 49, ante. "The stimulus to investment through liberalized depreciation is most important with respect to the creation of new assets."
60 In 1947 and 1948 Congress held extensive Revenue Revision Hearings. The
Treasury Department submitted an accelerated depreciation report in an attempt
to reduce the effect of Section 117(j) of the 1939 Internal Revenue Code.

Congress, in adhering to a policy of encouraging the sale and purchase of capital
equipment failed to take any action on this attempt. Again in 1950 the Secretary
of the Treasury attempted to persuade Congress to treat losses on depreciable
property as capital rather than ordinary losses. Congress rejected this recommendation as it did a similar one drafted by the Committee on Federal Taxation of the
American Institute of Accountants and submitted to Congress during the hearings on the 1954 Code. Finally, on January 18, 1960, during the course of this
litigation, the President in his budget message to Congress, recommended that
gain on the sale of depreciable property be treated as ordinary income.
61 United States v. Lewis, 340 U. S. 590, 71 S. Ct. 522, 95 L. Ed. 560 (1951)
(Douglas, Dissenting).
1 17 Ill. (2d) 51g, 162 N. E. (2d) 428 (1959), affirming 20 Ii. App. (2d) 244,
155 N. E. (2d) 821 (1959).

